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Abstract
Previous theoretical contributions on endogenous tariff formation have focused on trade mod-
els with homogeneous goods and constant returns to scale. This paper investigates the political
equilibrium of trade policy when economic structure is instead characterized by differentiated
products and increasing returns to scale and there exists intra-industry trade. The result shows
that endogenous tariffs are positive for all industries with non-negligible shares of world pro-
duction. However, the level of protection is less than the optimal tariff that would otherwise
be imposed by a benevolent government in an unorganized industry, and higher in an organized
industry. The protection provided to all unorganized (organized) industries increases (falls) with
the relative weight the government attaches to aggregate welfare vis-a`-vis campaign contribu-
tions and falls with the fraction of the population that belongs to a lobby group. The model
also indicates that the endogenous tariff level in an organized industry might be explosive. The
higher is the fraction of the population represented by a lobby and the higher is the weight on
aggregate welfare in the government’s objective function, the smaller is the possibility for such
an explosive tariff.
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1 Introduction
In order to reconcile the discrepancy between the well-embraced doctrine of “free” trade in theory
and the prevalence of trade restrictions among nations in practice, the literature of endogenous
trade policy has proposed “politics” as the missing element. When “politics” is introduced into
conventional trade models, the best policy for a country in general is not necessarily pursued;
instead, a policy that solicits the most political support or survives in the political competition
process might be adopted. This endogenous trade policy determination process has been modelled
theoretically and documented empirically by a large and distinguished literature developed over
the years. For a comprehensive survey of this literature, the readers are referred to Rodrik (1995),
among others.
Previous theoretical contributions on endogenous determination of trade policy have focused on
models with homogeneous goods and constant returns to scale. The two major trade models that
are used most frequently are the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Magee et al., 1989; Mayer, 1984) and the
Ricardo-Viner model (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982; Hillman, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
Thus the trade structure that underlies the alternative specifications of political process introduced
by these papers is restricted to one-way trade. It is therefore interesting to see what the pattern of
endogenous trade policy would look like when the economic structure is instead characterized by
differentiated products and increasing returns to scale and there exists intra-industry trade.
The optimal trade policy for a country under monopolistic competition has been studied by Gros
(1987) and Flam and Helpman (1987), among others. Gros (1987) used Krugman (1980)’s model
and showed that even a small country has an optimal positive tariff, which equals the proportional
markup used by monopolistically competitive producers. When the model is broadened to include
both a homogeneous and a differentiated sector, Flam and Helpman (1987) showed that a small
tariff is welfare improving, but that other industrial policies’ welfare consequences depend on details
of the production structure and the sectoral interlinkages through factor markets and preferences.
To investigate the political equilibrium of trade policy when countries are characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition and intra-industry trade, this paper embeds the Krugman (1980) model into
the Ricardo-Viner specific-factors model and uses the campaign contribution approach of Grossman
and Helpman (1994) to derive the endogenous tariff equilibrium.
The result shows that when the number of varieties produced at home relative to the rest of
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the world in an industry is negligible, the industry can not secure any import protection, regardless
of whether the government has only the national interest in mind or is politically motivated. In
general, as the number of varieties produced at home relative to the rest of the world in an industry
increases, the endogenous tariff increases. In other words, a larger industry will receive higher
protection, regardless of whether the industry is represented by a lobby group or not.
This appears to contrast with Grossman and Helpman (1994), where this is true only for or-
ganized sectors. When an organized sector has a larger domestic output relative to imports, it
is protected by higher import tariffs. The size effect works in the opposite direction if the sector
is unorganized. The larger is an unorganized industry relative to its imports, the bigger is the
magnitude of negative protection (import subsidy) it will receive.
However, it is shown here that the endogenous protection pattern that emerges in this monopo-
listic competition model actually parallels that of Grossman and Helpman (1994) very much, if we
adjust for the difference in the benchmark (optimal) tariff levels, which are zero in Grossman and
Helpman (1994) for a small competitive economy but are positive in the current study with monop-
olistic competition. Under both economic structures, the protection levels for organized sectors are
higher than the benchmark level, while they are lower than the benchmark level for all unorganized
sectors. As the government places less weight on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contribu-
tions, the more will the endogenous tariff levels in both organized and unorganized sectors diverge
from the benchmark tariff level. Otherwise, they will converge toward the benchmark. Moreover,
it is also true under both economic structures that protection levels in all sectors decrease with
the fraction of the population that belongs to a lobby group. Overall, therefore, we can conclude
that the endogenous protection pattern under monopolistic competition with intra-industry trade
compares similarly to that of perfect competition with inter-industry trade once we adjust for the
difference in their benchmark optimal tariff levels.
This study also indicates that with monopolistic competition and intra-industry trade, the en-
dogenous tariff level in an organized industry might be unbounded for certain parameters. This
happens when a condition in the model holds, which depends on such demand and political param-
eters as the elasticity of substitution among varieties in the industry, the fraction of the population
that is represented by a lobby, and the weight that the government places on aggregate welfare
relative to campaign financing. The higher is the fraction of the population that is represented by
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a lobby and the higher is the weight on aggregate welfare in the government’s objective function,
the smaller is the possibility for such an explosive tariff.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the preference and production
structure of the model and derives the corresponding equations in the political framework of Gross-
man and Helpman (1994). Section 3 then investigates the protection pattern for intra-industry
trade in both the “small” industry case and the general case. Concluding remarks are collected in
Section 4.
2 The Model
Suppose that a country is populated by individuals with identical preferences but different factor
endowments. On the preference side, each individual maximizes utility given by
U = X0 +
n∑
i
Ui(Xi)
where X0 is the consumption of homogeneous good 0 and Xi is an index of consumption of differ-
entiated goods in industry i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The homogeneous good is taken as numeraire, with a
world and domestic price equal to 1. The index of consumption of differentiated goods in industry
i takes the usual Dixit-Stiglitz form (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977):
Xi = (
mi∑
k=1
xρiik +
m∗i∑
k=1
x∗ik
ρi)1/ρi 0 < ρi < 1
where xik (x∗ik) is the consumption of domestic (foreign) variety k of good i and mi (m
∗
i ) is the
number of varieties of good i produced at home (abroad). The price index for a differentiated good
i is
Pi = (
mi∑
k=1
p1−σiik +
m∗i∑
k=1
p∗ik
1−σi)1/1−σi (1)
where pik (p∗ik) is the consumer price at home for domestic (foreign) variety k of good i and
σi = 11−ρi > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among different varieties of good i. For simplicity, Ui
is assumed to take the form of Ei lnXi, which amounts to assuming that an individual allocates
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a fixed amount of expenditure Ei for good i.1 The rest of the world is assumed to share the same
preference structure.
On the production side, the homogeneous good is assumed to be manufactured from labor alone
with constant returns to scale and a unit labor requirement equal to 1. It is produced both at home
and abroad, and is traded freely and costlessly. Therefore, the wage is equal to 1 universally.2
Production of the differentiated goods requires labor and a sector-specific input. Each variety of
the differentiated good i is assumed to require a fixed amount of the sector-specific factor ki in order
to produce at all; after that, there is a constant unit labor requirement, ai. Assume that there are
a large number of varieties (home and foreign combined) available to the consumer. Then given
the preferences specified above, each variety’s producer faces an approximately constant elasticity
of demand, equal to σi. With profit maximization, each domestic variety’s producer charges the
same price:
pik = pi =
ai σi
σi − 1 . (2)
The sector-specific factors in this country are assumed to be available in inelastic supply (K¯i, i =
1, 2, . . . , n). Therefore, the size of a differentiated-good industry in a country is predetermined by
the amount of the sector-specific factor that the country is endowed with. That is, the number of
varieties produced at home in industry i would be mi = K¯i/ki. It is assumed that the technology
abroad to produce the differentiated products is the same as that at home, so any difference in the
consumer price of a variety from home and from abroad would reflect only government intervention
and nothing else. That is,
p∗ik = p
∗
i = τi pi τi ≥ 0 (3)
where τi is the government intervention in sector i. For example, in the case of an import tariff, τi
is one plus its ad valorem level.
In the presence of intra-industry trade, an export subsidy (tax) would help (hurt) the domestic
firms in much the same way that an import tariff (subsidy) would. The former expands (shrinks)
the domestic firms’ market shares in the export market, while the latter expands (shrinks) them
1To see this, note that by the first order condition, it holds that ∂U
∂X0
= λP0 or λ = 1. Similarly,
∂U
∂Xi
= λPi, or
Ei
Xi
= Pi. It follows that Ei = PiXi.
2In this setup, the presence of the homogeneous good ties down the relative producer prices of the differentiated
goods from home and abroad, and hence eliminates possible terms of trade effects from import tariffs or subsidies
that are applied to these goods. This point has been suggested by Helpman and Krugman (1989, p. 140) in a similar
structure.
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in the domestic market. This study focuses on one of these two dimensions, and assumes that the
government only intervenes in trade using an import tariff or subsidy.
Given the structure of preferences, we can solve the utility optimization problem in two stages.
In the first stage, an individual with an income of E will consume Xi = Di(Pi) of the index of
differentiated good i (where Di(Pi) = Ei/Pi) and X0 = E−
∑
i PiDi(Pi) of the homogeneous good.
The indirect utility function therefore can be expressed as
V (P, E) = E + s(P), P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) (4)
where s(P) ≡ ∑i Ui[Di(Pi)] −∑i PiDi(Pi) is the consumer surplus derived from consumption of
the index of the differentiated goods. Using equations (2) and (3), we can simplify the price index
for the differentiated good i in equation (1) as
Pi = pi (mi +m∗i τ
1−σi
i )
1/1−σi .
It can be shown that ∂s(P)/∂Pi = −Di < 0 and ∂Pi/∂τi > 0. Therefore,
∂s(P)
∂τi
= −Di∂Pi
∂τi
< 0
which says that raising the import tariff (subsidy) would reduce (enhance) an individual’s consumer
surplus.
In the second stage, with the given expenditure Ei on differentiated good i, the individual will
consume
xi = di(τi) =
Ei
pi
1
mi +m∗i τ
1−σi
i
of a representative variety of good i produced at home and
x∗i = d
∗
i (τi) =
Ei
p∗i
τ1−σii
mi +m∗i τ
1−σi
i
(5)
of a representative variety of good i produced abroad. It is straightforward to show that
∂di
∂τi
=
Ei
pi
(σi − 1)m∗i τ−σii
(mi +m∗i τ
1−σi
i )2
> 0, (6)
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and
∂d∗i
∂τi
= −Ei
p∗i
τ1−σii [σimiτ
−1
i +m
∗
i τ
−σi
i ]
(mi +m∗i τ
1−σi
i )2
< 0. (7)
Therefore, a higher tariff (subsidy) in industry i raises (lowers) the market shares of the home
produced varieties and lowers (raises) those of foreign varieties.
Take any tariff level or subsidy rate imposed abroad, τ∗i , as given. A representative home
producer of differentiated good i will produce at the scale of
yi = Ndi(τi) +N∗dif (τ∗i )
whereN(N∗) is total population at home (abroad) and dif is the foreign demand for a representative
home variety of good i, which is a mirror image of equation (5). Therefore, the aggregate reward
to the specific factor used in producing good i is
Πi(τi, τ∗i ) = mi(pi − ai)yi.
Since
∂Πi
∂τi
= mi(pi − ai)N ∂di
∂τi
> 0, (8)
a higher tariff (subsidy) in sector i benefits (hurts) the owners of the specific factor used in this
sector.
The net revenue from all taxes and subsidies, expressed on a per capita basis, is given by
r(τ) =
n∑
i
m∗i (τi − 1)pid∗i , τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn).
It is assumed that the government redistributes the revenue uniformly to each individual. Therefore,
r(τ) is the net government transfer to each individual. Because
∂r
∂τi
= m∗i pid
∗
i +m
∗
i (τi − 1)pi
∂d∗i
∂τi
> 0 if τi ≤ 1,
starting with free trade, a small increase in the tariff rate in any sector raises the transfer amount.
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However, with some manipulation, it can be shown that
∂r
∂τi
+
∂s
∂τi
= m∗i (τi − 1)pi
∂d∗i
∂τi
S 0 when τi T 1. (9)
That is, the consumer welfare (government transfer and consumer surplus combined) is highest at
the free trade level. Therefore, a general consumer without claims to any specific factor would be
hurt by any deviations from free trade.
In what follows, the political contribution framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994) will be
briefly reviewed and applied to the present model. This allows us to investigate the endogenous
tariff equilibrium in the next section.
As stated in equation (4), an individual’s welfare depends on his income level and the consumer
surplus he enjoys from the consumption of differentiated goods. A typical individual’s income
includes wages and government transfers, and possibly the reward from the ownership of some
sector-specific input. It is assumed that claims to the specific inputs are indivisible and nontradable
and individuals each own at most one type of specific factor. Given the fact that the owners of a
certain specific factor have a common interest in protection for their sector, they may choose to
unite their forces for political activity. It is assumed that in some exogenous set of sectors, denoted
L, the owners of the specific factors have been able to organize themselves into lobby groups. These
lobbies compete noncooperatively for the government’s favor and propose contribution schedules,
Ci(τ), contingent on the trade-policy vector set by the government, τ , to maximize the joint welfare
of their members.3 The joint welfare of a lobby i, Vi, is its gross welfare Wi net of the contribution
Ci made to the government. We observe that
Wi(τ) = li +Πi(τi) + αiN [r(τ) + s(τ)] (10)
where li is the total labor supply (and also the labor income) of owners of the specific input used
in industry i and αi is the fraction of the population that owns some of this specific factor.4
Faced with the contribution schedules offered by the lobby groups, the government selects a
3As will be seen immediately, a lobby’s joint welfare is tied to other sectors’ tariff rates as well as its own sector’s.
Therefore, a lobby will tailor its contribution schedule conditional on the whole vector of trade policies.
4Note that the total labor employed in an industry and the lobby that represents it (the specific-factor owners)
are potentially different. Equation (10) is only concerned with the welfare of the lobby members.
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trade-policy vector τ to maximize the objective function,
G =
∑
i∈L
Ci(τ) + aW (τ) a ≥ 0 (11)
where W is the aggregate, gross-of-contributions welfare and a is the weight that the government
places on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions. Aggregate gross welfare is the sum
of aggregate income, total tariff revenue, and consumer surplus; that is,
W (τ) = l +
n∑
i
Πi(τi) +N [r(τ) + s(τ)]. (12)
To facilitate the exposition of tariff equilibrium later, I will take the stricter version of Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) in assuming that the contribution schedules are globally truthful. A
contribution schedule is globally truthful if it everywhere reflects the true preference of a lobby. As
shown in Grossman and Helpman (1994), if the contribution schedules are globally truthful, the
government’s objective function is equivalent to
G˜ =
∑
i∈L
Wi(τ) + aW (τ). (13)
Let us first calculate the impact of marginal trade policy changes on the welfare of various
lobbies. Using equations (8), (9), and (10), we find that for lobby i, a small increase in τj will cause
its welfare to change by
∂Wi
∂τj
=
∂Πi
∂τj
+ αiN [
∂r
∂τj
+
∂s
∂τj
]
= δijNmj(pj − aj)∂dj
∂τj
+ αiNm∗j (τj − 1)pj
∂d∗j
∂τj
(14)
where δij is an indicator variable which equals 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Equation (14) says that
lobby i benefits from an increase in the protection of its own sector, but is hurt by any deviations
from free trade in other sectors. Starting with free trade, a small increase in the protection of
sector i would induce domestic consumers to switch demand away from imported varieties in sector
i toward domestically produced varieties. This would increase domestic varieties’ production and
accordingly the profit income (aggregate reward) to the specific-factor owners in sector i. On the
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other hand, for all other sectors, lobby i has only general interest as consumers in trade policies
that would affect import prices in these sectors. We have seen in equation (9) that it is in the
best interest of consumers that free trade be implemented, when both government transfers and
consumer surplus are taken into account. Therefore, lobby i would prefer free trade in all sectors
but its own.
Next, we sum the expression in (14) for all i ∈ L to obtain the joint impact on all lobbies of a
marginal tariff change in sector j,
∑
i∈L
∂Wi
∂τj
= IjNmj(pj − aj)∂dj
∂τj
+ αLNm∗j (τj − 1)pj
∂d∗j
∂τj
(15)
where Ij =
∑
i∈L δij is an indicator variable that equals 1 if industry j is organized and 0 otherwise,
while αL =
∑
i∈L αi is the fraction of the total population that is represented by a lobby. Equa-
tion (15) states that starting with free trade, lobby members as a group benefit from an increase in
the tariff on any good that is produced by an organized sector, but are hurt by any deviations from
free trade in all unorganized sectors. This together with equation (14) indicates that as lobbies
each bid for a positive tariff in their own sectors but free trade in all other sectors, they jointly bid
for import tariffs in all organized sectors but free trade in all unorganized sectors. The second part
of this lobbying pattern for trade policies is different from that in Grossman and Helpman (1994),
in which lobbying activity as a whole bids for import tariffs (or export subsidies) in all organized
sectors but import subsidies (or export taxes) in all unorganized sectors.
Finally, let us calculate the effect of a marginal tariff change on aggregate welfare. Using
equations (8), (9), and (12), we find that
∂W
∂τj
=
n∑
i
∂Πi
∂τj
+N [
∂r
∂τj
+
∂s
∂τj
]
= Nmj(pj − aj)∂dj
∂τj
+Nm∗j (τj − 1)pj
∂d∗j
∂τj
.
(16)
Equation (16) says that starting with free trade in sector j, a small increase in τj improves the
national welfare because of the increase in profit. Therefore, if the incumbent government is not
influenced by lobby activities and maximizes aggregate welfare when setting trade policies, the
optimal tariffs would be positive for every sector. This differs from the benchmark trade policy in
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Grossman and Helpman (1994) when the government is not politically motivated, as free trade in
every sector is efficient for a small, competitive economy that is studied in their model.
3 The Endogenous Tariff Equilibrium
We are now ready to investigate the equilibrium trade policies that would emerge in the campaign-
contribution framework with intra-industry trade. By using equations (13), (15) and (16), we
have
∂G˜
∂τj
=
∑
i∈L
∂Wi
∂τj
+ a
∂W
∂τj
= (Ij + a)Nmj(pj − aj)∂dj
∂τj
+ (αL + a)Nm∗j (τj − 1)pj
∂d∗j
∂τj
.
(17)
The first order condition (FOC) for an equilibrium trade-policy vector τ requires that ∂G˜∂τj = 0 for
j = 1, 2, . . . , n. When the equilibrium in a sector does exist, the tariff satisfies the following implicit
function:
τj − 1 = (Ij + a)mj(αL + a)m∗jσj
∂dj
∂τj
(−∂d
∗
j
∂τj
)
. (18)
However, as will be discussed later, an equilibrium tariff for an industry does not necessarily exist in
certain circumstances, so to investigate the existence and the properties of the tariff that maximizes
(13), let us rewrite ∂G˜∂τj as
∂G˜
∂τj
≡ [R(τj)− S(τj)]Z(τj), where
R(τj) = −∂dj
∂τj
/
∂d∗j
∂τj
,
S(τj) =
(αL + a)m∗jσj
(Ij + a)mj
(τj − 1),
Z(τj) = (Ij + a)Nmj(pj − aj)(−
∂d∗j
∂τj
).
R(τj) is the ratio of the changes in the market sizes of a home variety relative to a foreign variety
in industry j when τj varies, while S(τj) can be viewed as the ratio of the weights attached to the
consumer welfare loss relative to the producer welfare gain. Since Z(τj) > 0, the FOC is equivalent
to R(τj) = S(τj). When R(τj) < S(τj), lowering τj would increase the objective function G˜; when
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R(τj) > S(τj), the opposite holds true. Given equations (6) and (7), we note that
R(τj) =
(σj − 1)m∗j
σjmjτ
−1
j +m
∗
jτ
−σj
j
> 0 ∀τj > 0,
∂R
∂τj
=
σj(σj − 1)m∗j (mjτ−2j +m∗jτ−σj−1j )
(σjmjτ−1j +m
∗
jτ
−σj
j )2
> 0 ∀τj > 0,
∂2R
∂τ2j
=
σj(σj − 1)2m∗j 2τ−σj−2j (m∗jτ−σjj − (σj − 2)mjτ−1j )
(σjmjτ−1j +m
∗
jτ
−σj
j )3
R 0.
We can also show that
R(0) = 0, lim
τj→∞
R(τj)→∞;
∂R
∂τj
(0) = 0, lim
τj→∞
∂R
∂τj
(τj) =
(σj − 1)m∗j
σjmj
.
Therefore, R(τj) is a monotonic increasing function in τj starting from zero and increasing toward
infinity with the slope approaching
(σj−1)m∗j
σjmj
as τj becomes large. Nevertheless, we are not sure
about the curvature of R(τj). Intuitively speaking, when τj increases, the demand for a domestic
variety, dj , increases, while the demand for a foreign variety, d∗j , decreases. However, the rate of
increase in dj is bigger than the rate of decrease in d∗j . Therefore, as τj increases, R increases.
However, the rate of the increase in R could be increasing, constant, or decreasing, depending on
τj and the parameters. This schedule is only influenced by the demand and production parameters
and not by political factors, so it will stay the same as we alter the political scenarios.
On the other hand, S(τj) is a linear function in τj with S(1) = 0 and a slope of
(αL+a)m
∗
jσj
(Ij+a)mj
, which
depends on the parameters that characterize the political environment as well as the demand and
production structure. Let So(τj) and Su(τj) denote the schedule when the industry is “organized”
(Ij = 1) and “unorganized” (Ij = 0), respectively. In addition, it will serve as a benchmark to
look at the schedule that corresponds to the circumstance where politics is not present and the
government maximizes the general welfare. This is equivalent to setting αL = Ij = 0 and thus
S(τj) =
m∗jσj
mj
(τj − 1). Let Sb(τj) denote this schedule. In sum, the corresponding equations of
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S(τj) in different political scenarios are:
Su(τj) =
(αL + a)m∗jσj
amj
(τj − 1),
Sb(τj) =
m∗jσj
mj
(τj − 1),
So(τj) =
(αL + a)m∗jσj
(1 + a)mj
(τj − 1).
(19)
3.1 The Small Industry Equilibrium
When an industry is “small” such that the number of varieties produced at home relative to the
rest of the world is negligible (mjm∗j → 0), the corresponding R(τj) schedule becomes strictly convex.
To see this, note that
as
mj
m∗j
→ 0, R(τj)→ (σj − 1)τσjj ,
which is a strictly convex function of τj . On the other hand, the schedules, Su, Sb, So, all converge
to the vertical line that passes through τj = 1. Since 0 < R(1) = σj − 1 <∞, it must be the case
that R(τj) and S(τj) intersect once at τj = 1 and we have a unique equilibrium τj = 1. This is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Therefore, when the number of varieties produced at home relative to the rest of the world in
an industry is negligible, the industry can not secure any import protection from the government,
regardless of whether the government has the national interest in mind or is politically motivated.
Intuitively speaking, although a rise in the tariff on a certain industry benefits the producers of
home varieties, it hurts the consumers who deem the home varieties as imperfect substitutes for
the foreign varieties. When the number of varieties produced at home is negligible relative to
the rest of the world, the gain in profit by raising the tariff is overwhelmed by the loss in the
consumer welfare. This is true even when the government takes the lobbies’ interests into account
and weighs the production gain proportionately more against the consumer loss, as indicated in
equation (17). Therefore, free trade is optimal for such a “small” industry with a negligible share
of world production, whether the government is politically influenced or not.
In general, it can be shown that as the number of varieties produced at home relative to the rest
of the world in an industry increases (mjm∗j ↑), the endogenous tariff level in equation (18) increases.
In other words, a larger industry will receive higher protection, regardless of whether the industry is
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represented by a lobby group or not. This appears to contrast with Grossman and Helpman (1994),
where this is true only for organized sectors. When an organized sector has a larger domestic output
relative to imports, it is protected by higher import tariffs. The size effect works in the opposite
direction if the sector is unorganized. The larger is an unorganized industry relative to its imports,
the bigger is the magnitude of negative protection (import subsidy) it will receive.
3.2 The General Tariff Equilibrium
This section studies the general pattern of protection when the number of varieties produced at
home relative to the rest of the world in an industry is not negligible.
As a benchmark, let us start by investigating the optimal tariff level when political activities
are not present and the government is benevolent. It can be shown that ∂R∂τj <
∂Sb
∂τj
for all τj > 0.
Therefore, R(τj) and Sb(τj) intersect at a single point. Let τ bj denote the corresponding tariff . This
scenario is illustrated in Figure 2. Depending on the demand and production parameters, there
are other even more wiggly shapes that are possible for the schedule R(τj), but the slope of R(τj)
should be always less than that of Sb(τj). Since R(τj) > Sb(τj) for all τj < τ bj and R(τj) < Sb(τj)
for all τj > τ bj , G˜(τ
b
j ) is the local (and global) maximum and τ
b
j is the optimal tariff. It is easy
to see that R(1) − Sb(1) = (σj−1)m
∗
j
σjmj+m∗j
> 0. Hence, the optimal tariff rate is strictly positive for an
industry with non-negligible intra-industry trade. This verifies the observations made earlier on
equation (16).
If instead political activities are present but the industry is unorganized, the relevant S(τj)
schedule is Su(τj). Because Su(τj) has a bigger slope than Sb(τj), it follows that ∂R∂τj <
∂Su
∂τj
for
all τj > 0. Moreover, it is again true that R(1) − Su(1) = (σj−1)m
∗
j
σjmj+m∗j
> 0 . Hence, the equilibrium
tariff for an unorganized industry, τuj , is unique, and the tariff rate is strictly positive as shown in
Figure 3. However, the protection is less than the optimal tariff level the industry would otherwise
be granted by a benevolent government.
If the industry is organized, it is no longer necessarily true that ∂R∂τj <
∂So
∂τj
for all τj > 0. There-
fore, an equilibrium tariff in this sector does not necessarily exist. However, when an equilibrium
does exist as in Figure 4, the tariff level, τ oj , would be higher than that imposed by a benevolent
government. To see this, observe that R(τ bj ) = Sb(τ
b
j ) and Sb(τj) > So(τj) for all τj > 1, so it
follows that R(τ bj ) > So(τ
b
j ). As a result, τ
o
j must be higher than τ
b
j .
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The foregoing conclusion about the endogenous tariffs in unorganized and organized sectors
relative to those imposed by a benevolent government is actually very intuitive. Recall from equa-
tions (15) and (16) that when contributions are the only consideration for the government, the
lobbying forces as a whole would prompt the government to impose positive tariffs in organized
sectors and free trade in unorganized sectors. On the other hand, when national welfare is the only
concern, a benevolent government would prefer positive tariffs in all sectors. When both political
and national interests are taken into account as in (17), these two forces would restrain each other
and the end result is that the endogenous tariff in the unorganized sector falls below the benchmark
tariff level while the endogenous tariff in the organized sector rises above the benchmark tariff level.
As the government puts more weight on the national interest (a ↑), the endogenous tariffs in
either organized or unorganized sectors approach the optimal tariff level imposed by a benevolent
government. On the other hand, as the government puts more weight on campaign contributions,
the endogenous tariffs approach the desired levels of the lobbies. To see this, look at equation (19)
and Figure 5. As a → ∞, Su(τj) and So(τj) converge to Sb(τj) and we have τuj and τ oj converge
to τ bj . In contrast, as a → 0, Su(τj) and So(τj) diverge with the former approaching the vertical
line and the latter approaching
αLm
∗
jσj
mj
(τj − 1), which is the flattest possible line for So(τj) in a
given industry. Therefore, we have τuj converge to the free trade level and τ
o
j converge to its highest
possible level, which is the desired result of the lobbies.
In addition to the weight the government places on aggregate welfare, the protection pattern
across industries is also affected by the fraction of the population that is represented by a lobby.
As the fraction becomes higher (αL → 1), the emphasis on the loss in consumer welfare as in
equation (17) rises in the government’s decision. Therefore, the tariffs in each sector would be
reduced. The opposite is true when the fraction draws close to 0. This can be illustrated with
equation (19) and Figure 6. As αL → 1, Su(τj) and So(τj) pivot to the left with the former
approaching
(1+a)m∗jσj
amj
(τj−1) and the latter approaching Sb(τj). Therefore, both τuj and τ oj decrease
with τ oj converging to τ
b
j . In contrast, as αL → 0, Su(τj) and So(τj) pivot to the right with the
former approaching Sb(τj) and the latter approaching
am∗jσj
(1+a)mj
(τj − 1). Hence, both τuj and τ oj
increase with τuj converging to τ
b
j .
Therefore, the protection provided to all unorganized (organized) industries increases (falls) with
the relative weight the government attaches to aggregate welfare vis-a`-vis campaign contributions
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and falls with the fraction of the population that belongs to an organized lobby group.
It is interesting to note that the endogenous protection pattern that emerges from this study
actually parallels that of Grossman and Helpman (1994) very much, if we adjust for the difference
in the benchmark (optimal) tariff levels, which are zero in Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a
small competitive economy but are positive in the current study with monopolistic competition.
Under both economic structures, the protection levels for organized sectors are higher than the
benchmark level while they are lower than the benchmark level for all unorganized sectors. As
the government places less weight on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions, the
more will the endogenous tariff levels in both organized and unorganized sectors diverge from the
benchmark tariff level. Otherwise, they will converge toward the benchmark. Moreover, it is also
true under both economic structures that protection levels in all sectors decrease with the fraction
of the population that belongs to a lobby group. Overall, therefore, we can conclude that the
endogenous protection pattern under monopolistic competition with intra-industry trade compares
similarly to that of perfect competition with inter-industry trade once we adjust for the difference
in their benchmark optimal tariff levels.
Our last task is to explore the condition that guarantees the existence of a political equilibrium
tariff in an organized sector under the economic structure of monopolistic competition and intra-
industry trade.
PROPOSITION 1 The endogenous tariff for an organized industry j exists if ∂R∂τj <
∂So
∂τj
as
τj →∞, or equivalently σj−1σ2j <
αL+a
1+a ; on the other hand, if
σj−1
σ2j
> αL+a1+a , the endogenous tariff is
explosive.
[PROOF]: Since R(τj) is a strictly increasing function with R(0) = 0 and So(τj) is a linear function
with So(1) = 0, if ∂R∂τj <
∂So
∂τj
as τj → ∞, the schedule R(τj) must have intersected the schedule
So(τj) at an odd number of points and fall below it after the final intersection. Therefore, the
highest tariff level that satisfies the FOC is bounded and corresponds to a local (and potentially
a global) maximum of G˜(τj). The global maximum of G˜(τj), chosen among the local maxima,
therefore exists and we have a finite endogenous tariff in the organized industry. The situation is
illustrated in Figure 7. Since it is true that limτj→∞
∂R
∂τj
=
(σj−1)m∗j
σjmj
and ∂So∂τj =
(αL+a)m
∗
jσj
(1+a)mj
, ∀τj ,
the condition that limτj→∞
∂R
∂τj
< ∂So∂τj is equivalent to
(σj−1)m∗j
σjmj
<
(αL+a)m
∗
jσj
(1+a)mj
, or σj−1
σ2j
< αL+a1+a .
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On the other hand, if ∂R∂τj >
∂So
∂τj
as τj → ∞, or equivalently σj−1σ2j >
αL+a
1+a , R(τj) would rise above
So(τj) eventually. It follows that R(τj) − So(τj) > 0 after the final intersection, and it is always
beneficial to continue increasing the tariff. Therefore, the endogenous tariff level is unbounded and
explosive. The situation is illustrated in Figure 8. Note that in either of the scenarios, the condition
is “sufficient” but not “necessary”, as when σj−1
σ2j
= αL+a1+a , the endogenous tariff could be either
finite or explosive. Q.E.D.
Therefore, the endogenous tariff level for an organized industry might rise without limit. This
happens when the condition σj−1
σ2j
> αL+a1+a in the model holds for an organized industry j. This
condition depends on such demand and political parameters as the elasticity of substitution among
varieties in this industry, the fraction of the population that is represented by a lobby, and the
weight that the government places on aggregate welfare relative to campaign financing. The higher
is the fraction of the population that is represented by a lobby and the higher is the weight on
aggregate welfare in the government’s objective function, the smaller is the possibility for such an
explosive tariff.5
This is also very intuitive and ties closely to the observations made above on the effects of the
parameters αL and a on the protection patterns. Both higher αL and higher a would raise the slope
of So(τj) and shift it toward Sb(τj). This makes it more possible to realize the condition, ∂R∂τj <
∂So
∂τj
as τj →∞, and to have a finite endogenous tariff in an organized industry.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates the political equilibrium of trade policy when economic structure is char-
acterized by differentiated products and increasing returns to scale and there exists intra-industry
trade. This is accomplished by embedding the Krugman (1980) model into the Ricardo-Viner
specific-factors model and employing the political contribution framework of Grossman and Help-
man (1994) to derive the endogenous tariff equilibrium.
The result shows that endogenous tariffs are positive for all industries with non-negligible shares
of world production. However, if the industry is unorganized, the level of protection is less than
the optimal tariff that would otherwise be imposed by a benevolent government, while it is higher
5To see this, note that 0 <
σj−1
σ2j
< 1, 0 ≤ αL+a
1+a
≤ 1, ∂{
αL+a
1+a }
∂{αL} > 0, and
∂{αL+a1+a }
∂{a} > 0.
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if the industry is organized. As the fraction of the population that belongs to an organized lobby
group increases, the tariff in the sector decreases; the opposite is true when the fraction draws
close to zero. The protection pattern across industries is also affected by the relative weight the
government attaches to aggregate welfare vis-a`-vis campaign contributions. As the relative weight
increases, the endogenous tariffs in either organized or unorganized sectors converge to the optimal
tariff levels that would otherwise be imposed by a benevolent government. On the other hand, as
the government puts more weight on campaign contributions, the endogenous tariffs would diverge,
with those in unorganized sectors approaching the free trade level and those in organized sectors
approaching the desired levels of the lobbies.
The model also indicates that the political equilibrium of the tariff level in an organized industry
might be explosive. The higher is the fraction of the population represented by a lobby and the
higher is the weight the government places on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions,
the smaller is the possibility for such an explosive tariff.
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Figure 1: Endogenous Tariff in Small-Industry Case (mjm∗j → 0)
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Figure 2: Optimal Tariff in No-Politics Case
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Figure 3: Endogenous Tariff in Unorganized Sector
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Figure 4: Endogenous Tariff in Organized Sector when a unique equilibrium exists
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Figure 5: Endogenous Tariffs as a varies
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Figure 6: Endogenous Tariffs as αL varies
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Figure 7: Finite Endogenous Tariff in Organized Sector
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Figure 8: Explosive Endogenous Tariff in Organized Sector
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